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Studio authentication

Designs how a Copilot Studio agent knows who the user is and whose identity it uses - the agent's authentication setting, Microsoft Entra sign-in or another identity provider, single sign-on per channel, end-user versus maker or service credentials for knowledge and tools, and anonymous use. Use when choosing an agent's authentication setting, when users are asked to sign in repeatedly, or when an action runs as the maker.

Department
Copilot Studio
Lifecycle
Deliver, Assure
Maturity
builder, scaler, ai-enterprise
Risk tiers
1, 2, 3, 4
Platforms
copilot-studio, entra, power-platform
Editions
starter, scale, enterprise
Reviewers
security-privacy
Status
draft
Copilot Cowork
Copilot Studio plugin for Copilot Cowork, or this skill on its own: Download SKILL.md
Licence
CC BY 4.0, by Simon Foote

Purpose

Authentication decides what a Copilot Studio agent can know about its user and whose rights it uses to read knowledge and act. This skill designs the agent's authentication setting, the sign-in experience in each channel and the identity each knowledge source and tool runs under, so the agent never sees or does more than the user should. It usually goes wrong in three ways: an agent with internal tools published without authentication, actions that quietly run under the maker's account, and a sign-in experience so clumsy that users abandon the agent.

When to use

When not to use

Questions to ask first

  1. Who are the users - staff signed in to Microsoft 365, guests, customers or the public?
  2. Must answers be trimmed to each user's permissions, or is every answer safe for anyone who can reach the agent?
  3. Does any tool act in a system, and should it act as the user or under a scoped service identity?
  4. Which channels will the agent use, and does single sign-on work for this agent in each of them?
  5. What does the agent need to know about the user (name, role, region) and where does that information come from?

Required inputs

If the audience is not settled, authentication cannot be designed safely; record the gap rather than defaulting to no authentication. Never assume single sign-on works in a channel without testing it.

Decision framework

Audience and needAuthentication settingIdentity for knowledge and tools
Staff in Teams and Microsoft 365 CopilotMicrosoft Entra sign-in with single sign-on where supportedEnd user by default
Staff on an intranet page or custom appEntra sign-in configured for the channel, with single sign-on testedEnd user by default
Customers or partners with accountsManual configuration against the organisation's customer identity providerEnd user for their own records; scoped service identity only with approval
Anonymous public usersNo authenticationPublic knowledge only; no tools that read or change non-public data
Identity option for a tool or sourceUse whenControl
End userThe default, and always for user-specific dataAgent cannot exceed the user's rights
Dedicated service identityThe user has no direct access but the business process requires the actionMinimum scope, owner, approval, audit, and the user's identity passed for logging
Maker's personal accountPersonal prototypes onlyNever for a shared agent

Practitioner approach

Start with the audience, not the setting. Write down who can reach the agent in each channel and whether they are signed in there. Internal agents in Teams and Microsoft 365 Copilot usually have a signed-in user and can trim knowledge and tools to that user. Public websites usually do not, and an anonymous agent must be designed as if anyone in the world is using it.

Choose the authentication setting to match. For staff, use Microsoft Entra sign-in and require it for every conversation that can reach internal knowledge or tools. For customers, use the organisation's customer identity provider through manual configuration, with the identity team owning the app registration. Only choose no authentication when every knowledge source is public and no tool touches non-public data; record that decision and its reviewer.

Design single sign-on per channel. Where it is supported and configured, users are signed in silently; where it is not, they see a sign-in card, which many users ignore or find suspicious. Test sign-in in every channel with ordinary user accounts, including on mobile, and fix the configuration rather than asking users to tolerate prompts.

Map identity per knowledge source and tool. For each, record whether it uses the end user's identity, a dedicated service identity or something else. End-user identity keeps the agent within the user's rights and gives an honest audit trail. A service identity is sometimes right - for example to create a case in a system users cannot open directly - but it must be scoped to the operation, owned by a team, approved, and should carry the user's identity into the target system's logs where possible.

Use what the agent knows about the user sparingly. Signed-in agents can read profile attributes to personalise answers; take only what the conversation needs, and do not let user-supplied text override identity claims. A user typing "I am a manager" is not evidence that they are one.

Finally, plan for change. App registrations, secrets and certificates expire and identity providers change; record owners and renewal dates in the alm-and-environment-plan so the agent does not fail on an expiry date nobody tracked.

Outputs

Microsoft platform considerations

Copilot Studio offers several authentication settings, and single sign-on support, channel behaviour and admin controls over unauthenticated agents differ by channel and change over time. Check ms-copilot-studio-security-governance and ms-copilot-studio-guidance for current options, and ms-copilot-privacy for how identity affects grounding on Microsoft 365 content.

Adoption considerations

A smooth, silent sign-in is an adoption feature. Repeated prompts or unexplained sign-in cards drive users away; test the experience as a new user and include sign-in guidance in launch materials where a prompt cannot be avoided.

Knowledge considerations

Permission trimming of knowledge depends on the user being signed in and sources being connected with the user's identity. Agree the trimming behaviour with copilot-studio:studio-knowledge-architecture so content owners know who can see what.

Security and privacy considerations

Unauthenticated agents must not reach internal data. Shared agents must not run on personal accounts. Service identities are least privilege, owned and reviewed. Secrets live in a managed store, not in the agent. Identity claims from users in chat are never trusted for access decisions. Every decision here is evidence for security-privacy:ai-identity-and-access-review.

Responsible AI considerations

Not applicable as a separate concern, because authentication is a security control; its effect on fairness is limited to ensuring that answers trimmed to permissions are explained, so users with less access understand why answers differ.

Evaluation requirements

Test sign-in in every channel, permission trimming with at least two users of different access from tier 2, anonymous access attempts where the channel allows them, and every tool under a user who lacks rights in the target system.

Value measures

Track sign-in abandonment and authentication-related failures per channel, owned by the agent owner at agent level. A high abandonment rate at sign-in is a design defect, not a user problem.

Scale notes

Starter

Internal agents in Teams and Microsoft 365 Copilot with Entra sign-in and end-user identity throughout; no anonymous agents and no service identities without a reviewer.

Scale

Standard app registration patterns and owners, a register of service identities used by agents, and admin controls that prevent unauthenticated agents in non-public zones.

Enterprise

Align agent identities with the organisation's identity governance, including access reviews for service identities, conditional access for agent channels and automated alerts before secret or certificate expiry.

Hand-offs

Reviewer gates

security-privacy reviews any unauthenticated agent and any service identity from tier 1, and the full identity map from tier 2. An unauthenticated agent that can reach internal data, or a shared agent on a personal account, is a blocking finding.

Failure modes

Sources

references/sources.md in this skill lists the source records behind this skill, what each is authoritative for, how volatile it is and what you may do with it. Product availability, licensing, limits and preview status change often, so check the current source before stating them, and cite what you used.

Never

Source records for this skill

Copilot Studio security and governance

Microsoft Copilot Studio guidance documentation

Data, privacy and security for Microsoft Copilot

Credit

This skill was created by Simon Foote as part of CopilotForge, licensed under CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). Credit the author when you share or adapt it.